

Does Increasing Racial Minority Representation Contribute to Overall Organizational Performance? The Role of Organizational Mission and Diversity Climate

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Abstract

One underexplored question in the representative bureaucracy literature is whether public employees advocate for their demographic groups at the expense of other groups or their organizational roles. Many studies have focused on the link between passive representation, or the extent to which the public workforce reflects the demographic characteristics of its clients, and active representation, or the extent to which policies advance the interests of those people. However, little research has been done on whether and when increased representation by a certain group enhances overall organizational performance. This study examines the relationship between racial minority representation in U.S. federal agencies and the agencies' goal achievement while considering the moderating role of organizational mission and diversity climate. The panel data analysis shows that increased minority representation lowers agencies' goal achievement. However, a positive relationship exists between the two in agencies that mainly work to promote social equity for disadvantaged populations and foster a positive diversity climate in the workplace. These findings suggest that racial minority employees can better contribute to organizational success in agencies where they balance advocacy and organizational roles well and they are treated fairly and respectfully.

Keywords

racial minority representation, overall organizational performance, organizational mission, diversity climate, agency goal achievement

Introduction

Although many representative bureaucracy studies have focused on the implications of bureaucratic representation for equity and fairness in policy making and implementation, performance-oriented reforms have led scholars and practitioners alike to grapple with whether public organizations that reflect the demographic makeup of their clients see any overall improvement in organizational performance (Andrews, Ashworth, & Meier, 2014; Andrews, Groeneveld, Meier, & Schröter, 2015). This performance claim of representative bureaucracy can be related to the question of zero-sum games: whether greater representation by a certain group in a public organization benefits that client group at the expense of other client groups (Hindera, 1993; Meier, Wrinkle, & Polinard, 1999; Mosher, 1968). A few studies have examined the relationship between demographic representation by a certain group and overall organizational performance by analyzing outcomes aggregated at the organizational level (Andrews, Boyne, Meier, O'Toole, & Walker, 2005;

Fernandez, Koma, & Lee, 2018; Hong, 2016) or the outcomes of separate group analyses (Meier et al., 1999; Rocha & Hawes, 2009).

Scholars have called for more studies considering the role of contextual factors in the relationship between bureaucratic representation and overall organizational performance (Andrews et al., 2014; Andrews et al., 2015). They argue that the more appropriate question is *when* representative bureaucracy improves overall organizational performance, rather than *whether* it does, given “the larger institutional features that shape the circumstances in which bureaucrats exercise discretion and act to affect policy outcomes” (Keiser, Wilkins, Meier, & Holland, 2002, p. 554). Studies of whether increased representation by a certain group benefits an

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organization as a whole have addressed contextual factors such as management strategy (Andrews et al., 2005), the nature of tasks (Andrews et al., 2014), and clientele diversity (Fernandez et al., 2018). However, to the best of the present author's knowledge, no study has explored the role of organizational mission and diversity climate in this relationship, and this study attempts to fill this gap.

Organizational mission matters in turning demographic representation into a positive for organizations. Public employees face organizational pressures that may hinder their advocacy for clients with shared demographic characteristics (Herbert, 1974). However, in public organizations tasked with promoting social equity (i.e., redistributive agencies), employees from disadvantaged groups (e.g., racial minorities, women) may advocate for their demographic-based client groups while coming into less conflict with their organizational roles (Cornwell & Kellough, 1994; Meier, 2018; Romzek & Hendricks, 1982). Aligned with this view, public employees in redistributive agencies, regardless of gender, were found to hire more women and to prioritize women-friendly policies more than public employees in other agencies (Kelly & Newman, 2001; Saidel & Loscocco, 2005). These findings can be extended to racial minority (hereafter, minority) cases (Hindera, 1993; Selden, 1997). In short, employees' ability to balance their organizational roles and their advocacy for certain client groups depends on the extent of their organizations' support for such advocacy.

A positive diversity climate, or "employees' perceptions of their organization's commitment to diversity as indicated by its diversity policies and how they are implemented" (Oberfield, 2016, p. 765), may help public employees, particularly those with low power status (e.g., minorities), maximize their potential for organizational success while also balancing their advocacy and organizational roles. As agency socialization includes not only formal aspects, such as policies and rules, but also informal ones, such as organizational culture and interactions among employees (DeHart-Davis, 2017; Moyson, Raaphorst, Groeneveld, & Van de Walle, 2018), peer pressure and organizational climates can influence employees' attitudes (Ashikali & Groeneveld, 2015; Choi & Rainey, 2010) and thereby overall organizational performance.

This study examines how increased minority representation influences the goal achievement of U.S. federal agencies in ways dependent on agency mission and diversity climate. The rest of this study proceeds as follows. First, this study reviews the literature on representative bureaucracy and contextual factors that may moderate the relationship between minority representation and overall organizational performance. Second, research hypotheses are developed drawing on theoretical frameworks and previous empirical findings. Third, the study turns to the data, methods, and findings. Fourth, theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed.

Literature Review

Representative Bureaucracy and Overall Organizational Performance

The theory of representative bureaucracy holds that public employees sharing demographic characteristics with their clients—a proxy for having similar values and socialization experiences—tend to create and implement policies supporting those clients' interests (Kingsley, 1944; Mosher, 1968). A public workforce that is representative of the demographic characteristics of society is expected to incorporate diverse perspectives into policy making and implementation and thus to be more effective and legitimate (Krislov, 1974). Mosher (1968) distinguished between passive and active representation: Passive representation is the extent to which the public workforce mirrors the demographic characteristics of its clients. Active representation occurs when employees advocate for clients who share their demographic characteristics through policy making or implementation. Many studies have inferred evidence of active representation from increased policy benefits to particular represented client groups (Meier, 1993; Selden, 1997; Smith & Fernandez, 2010).

A key question in the literature is whether passive representation translates to active representation (Kennedy, 2014; Meier, 1993). A broad consensus exists on three conditions under which the passive–active link does occur: (a) when the policy is salient to the client group through historical or political processes, (b) when the client group directly benefits from the policy, and (c) when public employees have discretion in policy making and implementation (Keiser et al., 2002; Meier, 1993; Wilkins & Keiser, 2006). Several studies have supported the passive–active link with respect to race when these conditions are met (Meier, 1993; Selden, 1997; Smith & Fernandez, 2010; Theobald & Haider-Markel, 2008), but relatively little evidence exists of such a link for gender (Meier & Nicholson-Crotty, 2006; Wilkins & Keiser, 2006).

Few studies have examined whether passive representation by members of a particular group benefits that client group at the expense of others (Mosher, 1968). This idea of a zero-sum game is related to how overall organizational performance differs from active representation (Andrews et al., 2005; Kennedy, 2014). Given that goal attainment is the basic motivation of any organization (Simon, 1964), this study argues that active representation may contribute to overall organizational performance when it at least partially aligns with general organizational goals. By contrast, active representation may not contribute to overall organizational performance when it rarely aligns with those goals (Meier, 2018; Romzek & Hendricks, 1982; Yun, 2018).

The relationship between passive representation by a certain group and policy outcomes pertaining to all client groups is underexplored with a few exceptions. Meier et al. (1999),

after finding that increasing minority teacher representation improved test pass rates for both minority and White students, speculated that minority teachers brought new knowledge and perspectives that benefited all student groups. Focusing on inter-minority relationship, Rocha and Hawes (2009) showed that greater representation by African American teachers in schools led to fewer African American and Hispanic students being assigned to segregated classes. Other studies of policy outcomes aggregated at the organizational level have also found a positive relationship between increased representation by a certain group and overall organizational performance (Fernandez & Lee, 2016; Hong, 2016). By contrast, Andrews et al. (2005) showed that increased minority representation in local government in the United Kingdom lowered overall citizen satisfaction with the government.

As was discussed above, exploring the relationship between a particular group's bureaucratic representation and overall organizational performance can lead to insights into whether a trade-off occurs between advocacy for certain client groups and general organizational goals (Meier, 2018; Yun, 2018). This study anticipates that increased representation by particular groups contributes to overall organizational performance when this kind of trade-off is minimized. Thus, it is worth investigating contextual factors that increase or reduce these trade-offs. The next section discusses organizational socialization and its implications for bureaucratic behaviors, including advocacy for represented demographic groups (i.e., active representation).

The Passive–Active Link and Organizational Socialization

Organizations typically try to shape their employees' attitudes and behaviors so that they conform to organizational norms and values (March & Olson, 1983). To this end, organizations use several socialization mechanisms, such as policies, rules, and training. Organizational socialization also occurs in informal ways, for instance, through organizational culture and interactions among employees (DeHart-Davis, 2017; Moyson et al., 2018). Despite its contribution to role clarity and cohesiveness among employees, organizational socialization may suppress personal goals employees have that are inconsistent with the organization's interests, and this may negatively influence employees' attitudes (Bauer, Bodner, Erdogan, Truxillo, & Tucker, 2007).

Public employees' advocacy in favor of their demographic-based client groups, or active representation, is one source of organizational success (Lim, 2006; Meier et al., 1999), but its effectiveness depends on organizational context (Andrews et al., 2015; Keiser et al., 2002). Herbert (1974) noted that minority employees may face competing demands from stakeholders, including minority communities, organizational leaders, and colleagues. Martinez (1991) argued that in this situation, the minority employees may (a) abandon minority advocacy roles and conform to organizational expectations,

(b) compromise their expected roles for minority citizens and organizations, or (c) avoid conflicting situations.

Recognizing organizational socialization as a meaningful context, Mosher (1968) argued that the passive–active link can be weakened by the socialization process, despite the opposing argument that employees' values that were shaped in their pre-organizational experiences tend to remain through their organizational lives (Oberfield, 2009). In agreement with this, Meier and Nigro (1976) showed that agency socialization had a stronger influence on U.S. federal administrators' policy preferences than their demographic characteristics. Wilkins and Williams (2008) found that greater representation of African American and Hispanic police officers increased the racial profiling of those groups, and they speculated that police socialization had prevented those officers from advocating for minorities.

Focusing on employees' role perceptions, Selden (1997) examined whether organizational socialization outweighed individual values or norms. She investigated how public employees adopted "minority representative roles," or their willingness to advocate for minorities. In her study of the Farmers Home Administration's Rural Housing Loans program, she found that minority employees had a higher perception of minority representative roles, which led them to award more loans to minority clients than White employees did, even after the effects of organizational socialization were accounted for.

Taken together, employees undergo organizational socialization that may suppress their advocacy toward clients with the same demographic characteristics. And increased minority representation in a public organization may not contribute to overall organizational performance when minority advocacy conflicts with general organizational goals. In this dilemma, minority employees are less likely to perform minority representative roles (i.e., active representation). Even pursuing minority interests while accepting the risks of doing so may not be welcomed by their organizations and could result in backlash.

In light of these considerations, this study examines the circumstances, as shaped by organizational mission and diversity climate, in which minority employees do advocate for minority interests (i.e., engaging in active representation) while still pursuing organizational roles and contributing to general organizational goals (i.e., enhancing overall organizational performance). The next section discusses the potential ineffectiveness of minority representation in the U.S. federal government, this study's research context.

Racial Minority Representation in U.S. Federal Agencies and Overall Organizational Performance

Lowi (1972) proposed four policy areas—distributive, regulatory, redistributive, and constituent—as associated with different organizational missions, structures, processes, and clients (Lowi, 1972; Meier & Bohte, 2007). Many subsequent

studies have adapted this typology (Kelly & Newman, 2001; Meier & Bohte, 2007; Ripley & Franklin, 1991). The U.S. federal government that encompass these policy areas makes a desirable setting for investigating the role of organizational factors in the relationship between passive representation by a certain group and overall organizational performance. Among several types of performance, this study examines federal agencies' goal achievement.

Minority representation in U.S. federal agencies has increased over the years despite lagging at higher organizational levels (Ricucci, 2009). Several decades ago, Long (1952) recognized that public organizations in general had been more representative than legislatures of U.S. demographic attributes, including race. The representation of minorities in the federal workforce increased from 30.4% in FY2000 to 36.4% in FY2016 (Office of Personnel Management [OPM], n.d.). By contrast, the U.S. Congress has remained highly unrepresentative of the country's racial demography, posing a challenge to the consideration of diverse racial groups' interests and needs in policy making. Despite the country's growing racial diversity, minorities have made up less than 20% of Congress since 1950 (Bialik & Krogstad, 2017). When minority representation in Congress and the federal government are considered together, this study expects increased minority representation in federal agencies to reduce the agencies' goal achievement due to potential goal misalignment between Congress and federal agencies. Supporting ideas for this expectation are discussed below.

The goals of U.S. federal agencies are likely to reflect Whites' interests much more than minorities'. Because of their disadvantages in political, social, and economic power, as evidenced in several sources (Kriwo & Kaufman, 2004; Oliver & Shapiro, 2006), minorities in general may have fewer opportunities to influence public policy than Whites. Minorities' relatively low socioeconomic statuses may hinder their political participation, including voting, making campaign donations, signing petitions, and staging demonstrations, which are important ways of influencing policy agendas and government decisions (Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999; Segura & Rodrigues, 2006).

Despite their discretion in making and implementing policies, federal agencies are subject to legislative influences to a greater or lesser degree (Wood & Waterman, 1991). The hypothesized links among demography, value, and behavior (i.e., the passive-active link) can also apply in the legislature setting (Mansbridge, 1999; Pitkin, 1967). Empirical findings showed that a White-dominant legislature tended to enact and pass laws that promoted Whites' interests while caring relatively less about minorities' interests (Bratton & Haynie, 1999; Mansbridge, 1999). Thus, this study posits that Congress tends to influence federal agencies in a way that prioritizes Whites' interests over minorities'.

This study expects the U.S. federal government and Congress in general to pursue Whites' interests more than minorities'. Thus, an alignment of goals between Congress

and the federal government, accompanied by high collaboration and low transaction costs, is more likely to occur when there is sufficient White representation in both institutions (Kingsley, 1944; McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1989; Wood & Waterman, 1991). With the changing dynamics between the two parties over time, goal misalignments between Congress and federal agencies may generate problems such as bureaucratic shirking and increased oversight costs, which could negatively affect federal agencies' goal achievement in turn (Waterman & Meier, 1998).

Hypothesis 1: Minority representation will be negatively associated with U.S. federal agencies' goal achievement.

This study discusses three potential contextual factors that are expected to result in a positive relationship between minority representation and federal agencies' goal achievement: agency mission, financial publicness, and diversity climate. An agency mission indicating variation in policy areas and organizational cultures can significantly affect employees' attitudes and behaviors (Desmidt, 2016; Piotrowski, Rosenbloom, Kang, & Ingrams, 2018). Among the four policy types proposed by Lowi, this study focuses on redistributive policy, which "taxes one group of people to provide benefits for another group" (Meier & Bohte, 2007, p. 92), such as income stabilization, welfare, health care, and housing. In the United States, historically disadvantaged groups such as minorities and women have been considered the main beneficiaries of redistributive policies (Ripley & Franklin, 1991). This study expects that greater minority representation enhances the goal achievement of redistributive agencies for several reasons.

In redistributive agencies, minority public employees can advance minority interests without coming into much conflict with general organizational goals. Because redistributive policies mainly target minorities and other less-privileged groups, minority employees may easily obtain support for their minority advocacy, which is likely to contribute to general organizational goals (Cornwell & Kellough, 1994; Romzek & Hendricks, 1982). In addition, minority employees who balance advocacy and organizational roles well may have a greater commitment to the success of their organizations than employees who do not.

In addition to active representation, increased minority representation can positively affect overall organizational performance by positively changing the minority-White relationship within an organization (Hong, 2016; Lim, 2006). In redistributive agencies tasked mainly with promoting social equity, goal alignment between the two groups is more likely and may foster intergroup interaction and reduce group-based bias and prejudices. Furthermore, social interaction between the two groups may promote White employees' cultural understanding of minorities, contributing to the agency goal of advancing social equity by addressing the challenges that disadvantaged groups, including minorities, face. In

support of this argument, Saidel and Loscocco (2005) showed that both male and female administrators in redistributive agencies prioritized women-related policy issues over other ones.

On the demand side, a particular group's passive representation in the public workforce may help public organizations gain more cooperation and trust from clients who share that demographic membership, and this can contribute to successful policy implementation and organizational goal achievement (Lim, 2006; Riccucci & Van Ryzin, 2017). Research has shown that clients tend to prefer interacting with public employees of their own demographic groups due to psychological safety, smooth communication, and shared values, among other things (Fernandez et al., 2018; Meier et al., 2006; Theobald & Haider-Markel, 2008).

Hypothesis 2: Minority representation will be positively associated with the goal achievement of U.S. federal agencies tasked mainly with advancing social equity.

The publicness literature provides insights into organizational contexts conducive to advancing minority interests. Publicness is defined as “the degree to which the organization is affected by political authority” (Bozeman, 1987, p. xi), and a broad consensus exists on its three dimensions: ownership, funding, and political authority (Rainey, 2009). This study focuses on the role of financial publicness—measured as the proportion of the agency's revenues coming from governmental sources (Chun & Rainey, 2005)—in the relationship between minority representation and agency goal achievement.

Different types of financial resources are linked to a variety of goals and priorities (Feeney & Welch, 2012), and organizations with high levels of publicness tend to enhance equity in public service delivery (Amirkhanyan, Kim, & Lambright, 2008; Moulton, 2009). Because government agencies rely on tax revenues, which are often accompanied by restrictions and external oversights, public employees tend to experience more pressure to pursue social equity in organizational procedures and outcomes. According to neo-institutional theory, however, even without legal or regulative requirements to pursue equity (i.e., a regulative perspective), large tax revenues may shape organizational structure and culture (i.e., normative and cultural perspectives) in such a way that the organization considers the interests of broad constituent groups rather than particular dominant groups (Moulton, 2009).

Based on the above discussion, a higher level of financial publicness may imply more recognition of disadvantaged groups in the setting and implementing of agency goals, which may help minority employees compromise personal goals (including minority advocacy) and organizational goals. In support of this possibility, Amirkhanyan et al. (2008) found that public nursing homes received more Medicaid patients than for-profit and nonprofit nursing

homes without sacrificing the quality of patient care. In addition, Kulis (1997) showed that female faculty members tended to experience more gender-based disadvantages in universities that generated large portions of their operating budgets from endowments accompanied by little external monitoring.

Hypothesis 3: Minority representation will be positively associated with the goal achievement of U.S. federal agencies that receive more government funding.

Minority employees who have been marginalized in organizations may feel pressured to conform to organizational norms set by dominant groups (Herbert, 1974). This pressure may hinder them from actively engaging in organizational processes. In the face of organizational socialization, minority employees may even act against minority interests to fit in with majority groups (Wilkins & Williams, 2008).

The above discussion supports the need for an inclusive culture that helps minority employees bring their perspectives and knowledge to organizational processes. Research has shown how a receptive diversity climate positively influences employee outcomes such as turnover intention, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and perceived performance (Ashikali & Groeneveld, 2015; Choi & Rainey, 2010). The benefits of a positive diversity climate may be greater for minority employees who have experienced more inequity in the workplace than White employees (McKay et al., 2007). A receptive diversity climate may also provide minority employees with buffers from agency socialization that might assimilate them into the dominant organizational norms (Kelly & Newman, 2001).

A positive diversity climate may also reduce race-based bias or prejudice by promoting interactions between minority and White employees. Social categorization theory explains that employees tend to prefer working with similar people and exhibit prejudice toward dissimilar people (Van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). In the face of increased minority representation, White employees who perceive a threat to their dominant status may display negative attitudes toward minority groups. An effective way to reduce the conflict between the two groups is to create an inclusive environment where they communicate with mutual respect and establish a cultural understanding (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008).

Hypothesis 4: Minority representation will be positively associated with the goal achievement of U.S. federal agencies that have positive diversity climates.

Data and Method

Data

This study uses a 4-year (2012-2015) panel data set. The unit of analysis is the parent-level U.S. federal agency.

The sample sizes vary from 129 to 204 agencies, including executive departments, independent agencies, and the executive office of the president. The data were compiled from several sources, including the OPM's FedScope website, Performance and Accountability Report (PAR), Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS), federal agency budget, U.S. government manual, and federal regulatory directory.

Variables

Dependent variable. The dependent variable is the agency's goal achievement rate, as used in previous research (Fernandez et al., 2018; Fernandez & Lee, 2016; Lee & Whitford, 2013). To create this variable, this study gathered data from each federal agency's PAR. The Government Performance and Result Act (GPRA) of 1993 requires each federal agency to submit an agency strategic plan, annual performance plan (APP), and PAR to Congress and the president. The PAR includes the management's discussion and analysis, performance information, and financial information.

At the beginning of every 4-year presidential term, each federal agency is to provide a strategic plan addressing its general and long-term goals. The agency should justify these goals and describe its plans to achieve them, any expected difficulties, and its budget plans. The agency also provides an APP in which it develops its performance goals for the current and upcoming fiscal years. A performance goal is "a target level of performance expressed as a tangible, measurable objective, against which actual achievement can be compared, including a goal expressed as a quantitative standard, value, or rate" (GPRA, 1993). Unlike performance metrics that are externally imposed on public organizations (e.g., crime rates, test scores), federal agencies develop performance goals on their own, and thus may have incentive to set easier ones. However, several monitoring systems exist to encourage agencies to set achievable but meaningful goals. In developing and adjusting its performance goals, the agency should periodically consult with several stakeholders, such as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the president, and congressional committees.

Performance goals accompany performance indicators that assess "the relevant outputs, service levels, and outcomes of each program activity" (GPRA, 1993), typically expressed as targets that are expected to be achieved by the end of fiscal year. Generally, the indicators should be "objective, quantifiable, and measurable" (GPRA, 1993). The indicators vary depending on the agency's strategic goals and encompass customer service, efficiency, input, intermediate outcome, process, outcome, and output (OMB, 2016).

The PAR reports the achievement status for each performance goal by comparing the results to the targets. In addition, it explains how the agency ensures the validity and reliability of its performance measures, including information about the data sources and the level of accuracy required to use the data. For any unmet goals, the agency should report the difficulties in achieving those goals and its

improvement plans. This performance information is included in the agency's congressional budget justification report and shared on the agency's website and at performance.gov for public viewing.

This study creates its dependent variable, the goal achievement rate, by dividing the number of exceeded and achieved performance indicators by the total number of indicators (i.e., exceeded, achieved, not achieved, and uncertain) for the fiscal year and multiplying the result by 100. Uncertain goals are those without targets or results. As performance indicators include broad aspects of organizational effectiveness, this study argues that the goal achievement rate indicates the competing values approach to overall organizational performance (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983). Figure 1 reports the distribution of the dependent variable.

Main independent variable. The main independent variable is minority representation. This study uses the minority percentage within the federal agency. A group percentage is the appropriate choice because this study focuses on the effects of increased numbers of minority public employees (instead of the racial similarity between the federal workforce and the population), which implies more decisions being made by minority employees (Hindera, 1993), on agency goal achievement. This study creates the independent variable by using racial demographic data from the OPM's FedScope. To account for a potential simultaneous relationship between minority representation and goal achievement, the minority percentage is lagged by 1 year. Nevertheless, this study acknowledges that this procedure does not fully address the possibility that goal achievement reversely affects minority representation (e.g., more minorities are drawn to agencies with goals that are difficult to achieve); thus, caution is called for in interpreting this study's findings.

Control variables and moderators. The regression models include agency-level control variables that may influence agency goal achievement. First, the models control for the agency's structural characteristics by including information about whether the agency belongs to the executive branch of the federal government, whether the agency head has a fixed term, and whether the agency is a regulatory one. Second, the percentage of political appointees in the agency is included because politicization may influence the agency's processes and outputs (Wood & Waterman, 1991). Third, the agency's age and the total number of employees (logged) are included to account for the agency's history and size. Fourth, the models include average employee tenure, average salary, percentage of employees with administrative or professional occupations, and percentage of employees with a bachelor's degree or higher to control for the effects of organizational resources on agency goal achievement (Lee & Whitford, 2013). Fifth, the percentage of uncertain goals is included to control for agency accountability and transparency in goal setting and implementation. Sixth, the models include the total number of agency goals because it may




Figure 1. Distribution of goal achievement.

be easier for an agency to achieve a low number of goals. Seventh, the models include the percentage of female employees to control the effects of the workforce's gender demographics on agency goal achievement. The findings are mixed on the effects of female representation on organizational performance, suggesting that this link is context-dependent (Park, 2013; Smith & Monaghan, 2013). Moreover, racial dynamics within agencies may depend on how their gender compositions converge with or diverge from their racial compositions (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). Lastly, year dummies are included to account for time trends that may stem from different causes, such as economic situations and changes in federal policies.

This study turns to three moderators in the regression models. As a measure of the extent to which the agency performs redistributive tasks, this study uses the percentage of the agency's gross outlay spent on social justice-related functions, as proposed by Cornwell and Kellough (1994). Agencies often deal with limited resources, and the way they spend their budgets may inform the nature of their missions and policy priorities (Cornwell & Kellough, 1994; Smith & Fernandez, 2010). The Government Accountability Office (GAO, 1998), in line with this perspective, argued that budget function classifications in the federal government were developed to "[represent] resources devoted to agency missions" (p. 8) and were "selected as the principal organizing framework to summarize the annual performance goals of federal departments and agencies" (p. 17). Following Cornwell and Kellough (1994), this study aggregates gross outlays in the following six budget functions from federal budget data: (a) community and regional development; (b) education, training, employment, and social services; (c) health; (d) Medicare; (e) income security; and (f) social security. The aggregated gross outlay in these

functions is divided by the total gross outlay, and the result is multiplied by 100.

This study also uses federal budget data to calculate the percentage of agency outlay from governmental sources, a measure of financial publicness (Chun & Rainey, 2005). Finally, this study measures minority employees' perceptions of their agencies' diversity climates by using 5-point Likert-type scale items from the FEVS (1 = *strongly disagree*, 2 = *disagree*, 3 = *neither agree nor disagree*, 4 = *agree*, and 5 = *strongly agree*). The three items are (a) "Policies and programs promote diversity in the workplace (e.g., recruiting minorities and women, training in awareness of diversity issues, mentoring)"; (b) "Supervisors work well with employees of different backgrounds"; and (c) "My supervisor is committed to a workforce representative of all segments of society" (Choi & Rainey, 2010; Oberfield, 2016). These items are used to create a factor score for each minority employee, and these scores are averaged at the agency level. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of all the variables used in this study.

Method

For analysis, this study uses pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and random effects (RE) with robust standard errors. The two methods yield mostly consistent results, as reported in Table 2. The parsimonious pooled OLS model for agency i in year t is displayed below, Goal achievement $_{it}$ is agency i 's goal achievement in year t ; $Minority\ representation_{i,t-1}$ is agency i 's minority representation in year $t-1$; $Moderators_{it}$ are agency i 's three moderators (agency mission, financial publicness, and diversity climate) in year t ; $Year_t$ is a vector of year dummy variables, with 2012 as a base category; X_{it} is a vector of agency i 's control variables in year t ; and ε_{it} is an error term. For the RE model, every part is the same except

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix.

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1. Goal achievement (%)	66.88	18.46	1																
2. Minority representation (%)	37.42	12.23	-0.33	1															
3. Women (%)	51.08	10.22	-0.22	.57	1														
4. Executive (dummy)	0.29	0.45	-0.08	-0.23	-0.23	1													
5. Fixed term (dummy)	0.51	0.50	0.04	0.12	.29	-0.65	1												
6. Political appointee (%)	1.62	3.89	0.03	0.05	.28	-0.18	.30	1											
7. Average tenure (years)	14.63	2.83	.20	.02	-0.05	-0.13	.23	-0.04	1										
8. Average salary (US\$)	100,461.60	22,296.99	.16	-0.32	-0.23	-0.40	.49	.13	.18	1									
9. Total employee (logged)	7.95	2.43	-0.08	-0.08	-0.25	.73	-0.62	-0.38	-0.10	-0.46	1								
10. Agency age (years)	66.36	50.36	0.12	-0.16	-0.02	.54	-0.35	-0.14	.07	-0.30	.50	1							
11. Total goal (#)	55.84	63.29	-0.02	-0.18	-0.28	.39	-0.42	-0.13	-0.02	-0.16	.44	.12	1						
12. Professional (%)	15.94	5.01	0.01	-0.13	0.10	-0.33	.27	.24	-0.10	.34	-0.51	-0.20	-0.25	1					
13. Bachelor or more (%)	66.28	16.28	.17	-0.29	-0.11	-0.40	.51	.13	.26	.78	-0.38	-0.24	-0.01	.09	1				
14. Social outlay (%)	26.45	41.64	-0.03	.22	.40	0.12	0.04	0.10	0.06	-0.32	.02	-0.07	-0.07	-0.11	-0.16	1			
15. Government outlay (%)	93.69	18.15	-0.18	.16	.18	-0.09	0.05	0.12	-0.05	-0.10	0.01	-0.07	0.00	0.10	0.02	1			
16. Uncertain goal (%)	9.91	14.38	-0.66	.17	0.04	.16	-0.12	-0.12	-0.05	-0.03	0.07	-0.13	0.04	-0.11	-0.04	0.09	1		
17. Regulatory agency (dummy)	0.34	0.48	.18	-0.06	-0.02	-0.42	.44	-0.08	.18	.44	-0.23	-0.14	-0.14	.09	.47	-0.02	-0.23	1	

Note. Sample size = 204; diversity climate (M = 0.17, SD = 0.17) is not included in the table because it significantly decreases the sample size. Correlation coefficients that are significant at $p < .05$ or better are shown in boldface.

Table 2. OLS and RE Regression Results.

DV: Goal achievement	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	OLS	RE	OLS	RE	OLS	RE
Minority representation	-0.36** (0.14)	-0.39* (0.20)	-0.66*** (0.14)	-0.18 (0.14)	-0.11 (0.15)	-0.24 (0.20)
Minority representation ²	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)				
Minority representation × SO			0.01*** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)		
Minority representation × GO			0.01*** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)		
Minority representation × DC					2.60*** (0.96)	2.13* (1.11)
Women	-0.15 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.20)	-0.30** (0.13)	-0.26 (0.20)	-0.33* (0.18)	-0.09 (0.21)
Executive	3.00 (3.21)	0.63 (4.91)	4.52 (3.12)	2.40 (4.31)	10.91** (4.67)	7.92 (6.50)
Fixed term	-5.32* (2.84)	-4.23 (4.46)	-1.11 (2.67)	-0.84 (3.87)	-2.09 (3.86)	-1.72 (5.07)
Political appointee	0.04 (0.26)	0.21 (0.28)	0.30 (0.27)	0.36 (0.22)	-2.10 (1.69)	-0.51 (1.64)
Average tenure	1.00*** (0.36)	1.05** (0.52)	0.82** (0.33)	0.83* (0.45)	1.12** (0.44)	0.69 (0.55)
Average salary	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Total employee	-1.38* (0.74)	-0.79 (1.07)	-1.12* (0.66)	-0.83 (0.87)	-0.86 (0.91)	-0.61 (1.18)
Agency age	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)
Total goal	-0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Professional	-0.37 (0.26)	-0.22 (0.33)	-0.23 (0.25)	-0.15 (0.28)	-0.15 (0.36)	0.16 (0.33)
Bachelor or more	0.01 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.15)	0.17* (0.09)	0.11 (0.11)	0.28* (0.15)	0.06 (0.18)
SO	0.05* (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.04)
GO	-0.10** (0.04)	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.14 (0.12)	0.02 (0.13)
Uncertain goal	-0.83*** (0.07)	-0.72*** (0.08)	-0.79*** (0.06)	-0.72*** (0.08)	-0.83*** (0.07)	-0.82*** (0.07)
Regulatory	3.44 (2.63)	2.80 (3.48)	2.40 (2.47)	1.90 (3.14)	2.97 (3.74)	1.32 (4.77)
DC					29.71*** (9.85)	35.15*** (10.59)
F statistic or Wald square	23.00***	337.11***	61.01***	616.19***	22.56***	
Overall R ²	.58	.58	.63	.62	.69	
Within R ²		.39		.36		
Between R ²		.66		.74		
Observations	204	204	204	204	129	

Note. Year dummies (2013-2015, 2012 is a base year) are omitted in the table; unstandardized coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported.

OLS = ordinary least squares; RE = random effects; SO = social outlay; GO = government outlay; DC = diversity climate.

*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

that the error term is divided into between-agency and within-agency categories:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Goal achievement}_{it} = & \alpha_{it} + \beta_1 \text{Minority representation}_{it-1} \\
 & + \beta_2 \text{Moderators}_{it} \\
 & + \beta_3 \text{Minority representation}_{it-1} \\
 & \times \text{Moderators}_{it} + \gamma_1 \text{Year}_t + X_{it} \beta + \varepsilon_{it}
 \end{aligned}$$

Hausman tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the RE model is preferred over the fixed effects (FE) model even at the 0.1 level. In addition, there is little within-agency variation in minority representation, the key independent variable, across years. Therefore, the FE model that relies purely on within-agency variation is less suitable in the present case (Zhu, 2012).

As a robustness check, this study conducts a fractional logit regression (family—binomial, link—logit) with robust




Figure 2. Interaction effect of social outlay and minority representation on goal achievement.




Figure 3. Interaction effect of government source outlay and minority representation on goal achievement.

standard errors. This analysis is conducted because the OLS with a proportion-dependent variable, like goal achievement rate in this study, may violate several OLS assumptions and predict values beyond 0 and 1 (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996). The results of fractional logit analyses are consistent with those of OLS and RE analyses. In addition, to address high correlations between the original and interaction terms, this study centers the minority representation and the three moderators to their grand means. Regression models with these centered variables yield consistent findings.

Findings

This study interprets the coefficients of the OLS results for ease of interpretation. To render the results of interaction

terms more substantively meaningful, marginal effect plots are reported in Figures 2 to 4. In Model 1 of Table 2, minority representation is negatively associated with the agency’s goal achievement ($\beta = -0.36, p < .05$). This finding supports Hypothesis 1 by demonstrating that organizational or political authority that emphasizes Whites’ interests may offer minority employees fewer opportunities and resources to influence goal setting and implementation in their agencies. To examine the potential role of critical mass (i.e., the minimum percentage of minority employees needed to influence the work process) in the relationship between minority representation and agency goal achievement (Meier, 1993), Model 1 includes the squared term of the minority representation variable. This variable has no significant association with the dependent variable.




Figure 4. Interaction effect of diversity climate and minority representation on goal achievement.

Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results: Effects of Representations by Different Racial Minority Groups.

Asian × SO	0.01 (0.01)	Asian × DC	5.76*** (1.52)
African American × SO	0.01*** (0.00)	African American × DC	0.80 (0.96)
American Indian × SO	0.00 (0.01)	American Indian × DC	4.46 (5.78)
Native Hawaiian × SO	-0.15 (0.21)	Native Hawaiian × DC	-63.44 (51.90)
Hispanic × SO	0.00 (0.01)	Hispanic × DC	3.23** (1.55)

Note. All other variables in Table 2 are included but not reported; due to the high collinearity, this study runs each interaction term separately in different models; unstandardized coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. SO = social outlay; DC = diversity climate.

* $p < .1$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$.

In Model 2 of Table 2, the relationship between minority representation and agency goal achievement becomes positive as the agency's social outlay, the extent to which it commits to redistributive tasks, increases ($\beta = 0.01$, $p < .01$). This finding suggests that minority employees comfortably advocate for minority clients in agencies that support minority advocacy (Cornwell & Kellough, 1994; Saidel & Loscocco, 2005). Consistent with this result, the slope indicating the effects of minority representation on agency goal achievement in Figure 2 becomes positive as the percentage of social outlay increases from the 10th to the 90th percentile. Thus, this study finds support for Hypothesis 2.

Model 2 of Table 2 shows that minority representation becomes more positively associated with agency goal achievement as the percentage of governmental source outlay increases ($\beta = 0.01$, $p < .01$). However, unlike the marginal effect plot of social outlay, Figure 3 provides little support for this finding. This is because the 95% confidence intervals of the two slopes (government outlays are set at the 10th and 90th percentiles, respectively) mostly overlap. In contrast to this study's expectation, the federal budget may not be under strong political control that emphasizes social equity in organizational processes.

In Model 3 of Table 2, the relationship between minority representation and agency goal achievement becomes positive as the diversity climate increases ($\beta = 2.60$, $p < .01$). Figure 4 shows that the slope indicating how minority representation affects agency goal achievement becomes positive as the level of the diversity climate changes from the 10th to the 90th percentile. Taken together, these results support Hypothesis 3, indicating that greater minority representation may improve agency goal achievement when agency leaders foster diversity and inclusion in the workplace.

Turning to control variables across the regression models, higher average tenure is positively related to agency goal achievement, suggesting that agencies with more experienced employees pursue organizational goals better. The percentage of uncertain goals, which indicates a lack of accountability and transparency in goal setting and implementation, has a negative relationship with agency goal achievement. In addition, female representation is negatively associated with the dependent variable. Perhaps federal agencies in general emphasize masculine policies over feminine ones, making female identity less salient and female representation thereby less effective for realizing agency goals (Smith & Monaghan, 2013).

This study also examines the roles that agency mission and diversity climate play in the relationship between different representation of racial minority groups (i.e., Asian, African American, American Indian, Native Hawaiian, and Hispanic) and agency goal achievement. Treating all racial minority groups as a singular *minority* may mask inter-minority relationships (Ricucci, 2009). Table 3, with the OLS results, shows that social outlay positively moderates the relationship between African American representation and agency goal achievement ($\beta=0.01, p < .01$), but no significant relationship is found for the other minority groups. In addition, a receptive diversity climate positively moderates the relationships between representation by Asians ($\beta = 5.76, p < .01$) and Hispanics ($\beta = 3.23, p < .05$) and agency goal achievement, but these results do not hold for the other minority groups.

Discussion

Drawing on the findings above, this section discusses several points. First, this study suggests that a particular group's passive representation improves overall organizational performance (measured as organizational goal achievement) when the zero-sum game—the trade-off between pursuing a certain group's interests and pursuing general organizational interests—is minimized. In the U.S. federal government, pursuing minority interests in general may mean giving less commitment to other important organizational goals. In federal agencies tasked mainly with addressing group-based inequities, however, increased representation by minorities may benefit White employees and the organization as a whole to some extent (e.g., by achieving the agency's goals). In short, passive representation by a certain group is likely to enhance overall organizational performance when active representation (i.e., public employees' advocacy for the represented population) advances general organizational interests.

This explanation can be applied to previous studies of how passive representation by a particular group influences performance pertaining to *all* constituent groups. The benefits of some policy outputs and outcomes generated by bureaucratic representation may not be exclusive to certain groups. For example, Andrews et al. (2014) found that greater representation by minority firefighters increased fire service effectiveness and the provision of fire prevention education to minorities. When minority firefighters increasingly offer such education to minorities (i.e., engaging in active representation), the information and practices they pass on may contribute to reduced fire accidents, which can benefit the community as a whole. In Hong's (2016) study in a law enforcement setting, minority police officers' advocacy for minorities may have increased their trust and feelings of legitimacy toward the police, and this in turn can benefit all community residents by improving police practices and thus public safety.

Second, given that agency goals shift over time and employees try to maximize their values and norms (Meier, 2018; Meier et al., 1999), public managers should encourage minority employees to pursue organizational roles that fit their personal goals. This may help minority employees balance their minority advocacy and organizational roles better. In short, this study argues that increased minority representation is not enough to achieve intended outcomes; effective management is important for leveraging representative bureaucracy in favor of organizational success (Andrews et al., 2005).

Third, although minority employees can contribute to agency goal achievement by advancing minority interests (i.e., active representation), organizations can also utilize minority employees' unique knowledge and perspectives by fostering a positive diversity climate in the workplace. Due to social categorization processes and power differences between minority and White employees, making the workforce more racially representative is not sufficient for maximizing minority employees' potential. Public managers should create inclusive work environments where minorities can work as change agents and Whites embrace different views of minorities. Individual-level analyses and qualitative studies can offer additional insights into how a positive diversity climate makes minority representation effective for enhancing overall organizational performance.

Fourth, this study found that agency mission and diversity climate did not influence all minority groups to the same degree. This finding may be attributed to inter-minority relationships and each minority group's relationship with White employees (McClain, 1993; Rocha & Hawes, 2009). McClain (1993) discussed that minority groups tend to compete with one another under zero-sum game situations but are more likely to cooperate when benefits are not exclusive to certain minority groups. In this study, African Americans constituted the majority of the minorities, so their issues may have had more salience than other groups' in setting and implementing organizational goals. In addition, due to differences in power and resources in organizations, certain minority groups may have advantages over others in pressing for their interests. In short, this study calls for considering both minority-White and inter-minority relationships in studying how to leverage representative bureaucracy for organizational success.

Conclusion

Expanding previous research on the link between passive and active representation, this study examines when passive representation by a certain group enhances overall organizational performance (measured as goal achievement by U.S. federal agencies). Agency mission and positive diversity climate matter in making minority representation effective for increasing agency goal achievement. These findings suggest that minority employees' advocacy toward minority clients

(i.e., active representation) and unique knowledge (or perspectives) contribute to the achievement of organizational goals, provided the advocacy goals are aligned with the organizational ones and organizational leaders foster inclusive work environments.

This study concludes with a discussion of limitations and suggestions. First, because performance can be understood in several dimensions (Rainey, 2009), future studies can use different performance indicators to find additional insights into the effects of representative bureaucracy on overall organizational performance. Second, agency-level analysis faces limitations in inferring employee behaviors in different organizational contexts (Nicholson-Crotty, Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty, & Redding, 2016; Theobald & Haider-Markel, 2008), such as in agencies that mainly perform social justice-oriented functions. Qualitative research or individual-level analyses could further illuminate how the increased presence of minorities affects overall organizational performance and the role of organizational mission and diversity climate in this process. Third, future studies can consider state and local governments, where more close interactions occur between public employees and citizens, and examine whether this study's findings hold in those research contexts. Fourth, although this study examines the roles of agency mission and diversity climate with different minority groups, its findings do not tell the full story of the advantages and disadvantages these groups experience. If the data permit, it is worth disaggregating each minority group (e.g., Asian) by ethnicity (e.g., East Asian, Central Asian, South Asian), which could help researchers unpack within-group differences that cannot be examined when subgroups are aggregated to a singular higher level group.

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