

# Does Increasing Gender Representativeness and Diversity Improve Organizational Integrity?

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## Abstract

Recent scholarship has suggested that representative bureaucracy improves organizational integrity. This article tests this argument with respect to gender, using data from Korean government agencies from 2008 to 2014. The findings suggest that an increase in female representation and diversity in public organizations leads to an improvement in the measured level of organizational integrity. We found, however, that incidents of sexual harassment and sexual violence in the workplace were positively, not negatively, correlated with increased female representation. This apparent contradiction is explained by the fact that a greater female representation may empower female officials to report unfair treatment or injustice that has hitherto been unreported and tolerated. Finally, the evidence suggests that the positive impact of representative bureaucracy on organizational integrity becomes substantially greater when the agency has a female leader. This suggests that a leader's gender influences the attitudes and behaviors of gender-congruent street-level bureaucrats.

## Keywords

representative bureaucracy, gender studies, organizational justice, leadership, public integrity

## Introduction

The theory of representative bureaucracy was developed to overcome criticisms of the merit-based recruitment system of public servants and to democratize bureaucracy. Kingsley first proposed the concept of representative bureaucracy in 1944, criticizing

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the authoritarian nature of the public sector in the United Kingdom and presenting representative bureaucracy as an alternative. Specifically, he argued that having public officials from various social backgrounds participate in the decision-making process would prevent government policies from being biased toward particular interests and improve the bureaucracy's political representation (Kingsley, 1944).

Since Kingsley's proposal in 1944, public administration scholars have developed the theory of representative bureaucracy. Past research in public administration has focused on testing whether passive representation leads to active representation. Passive representation indicates that the composition of bureaucrats reflects the demographic characteristics of the population the bureaucracy serves, whereas active representation refers to minority bureaucrats implementing policies in favor of the demographic groups they represent at their discretion (Mosher, 1968; Thompson, 1976). However, some recent scholars have also shown that representative bureaucracy has a positive impact on the *overall* performance of public organizations, rather than simply helping the minority group (Andrews, Ashworth, & Meier, 2014; Hong, 2016; Meier, Wrinkle, & Polinard, 1999).

Recent studies (e.g., Hong, 2016, 2017b) have proposed an improvement in organizational integrity as a major source of benefit for representative bureaucracy. Integrity within the bureaucracy can be defined in various ways. Although integrity includes a neutral and highly responsive attitude of public administrators (Finer, 1941; Flemming, 1953), it is regarded as comprising a level of morality and justice in terms of administrative behavior in general. In this study, we assume that organizational integrity may be defined as the aggregate of the individuals' ethical behavior within the bureaucracy, which is simultaneously affected by organizational culture, organizational system, or members' characteristics.

Specifically, this body of work has argued that diversifying the public workforce to reflect the community it serves may effectively improve the public organization's integrity. Hong (2017b) investigated the experience of the U.K. police force in implementing an ambitious plan to increase ethnic minority police officers during 1999 to 2010, and tested whether this increase led to a decrease in citizens' complaints. Overall, Hong (2017b) presented empirical support for the notion that representative bureaucracy improves organizational integrity in the context of ethnic representation.

In this study, we explored whether an increased representation in public organizations leads to an improvement in bureaucratic integrity in the context of gender representation. We also investigated whether the existence of female leaders influences the association between representative bureaucracy and organizational integrity. Although previous studies have paid significant attention to the effects of representation with regard to ethnicity, they have generally overlooked the role of gender in studying the theory of representative bureaucracy. Furthermore, although significant scholarly attention has been paid to the role of female leaders in a legislature in terms of democracy (Bratton & Haynie, 1999; Jewell & Whicker, 1994; Jeydel & Taylor, 2003; Thomas & Welch, 1991), there is little existing research that focuses on gender representation and leadership within bureaucracy and administration. This study addresses

this paucity and contributes to the extant body of literature by highlighting the role of gender and diversity within bureaucracy.

Specifically, we examined whether an increase in the proportion of female bureaucrats in public organizations leads to a subsequent improvement in organizational integrity. Gender representation was measured using the proportion of female bureaucrats in each agency, whereas organizational integrity was measured via both gender-related integrity and overall organizational integrity measures. The latter was measured using government agencies' integrity index, and the former via the incidence of gender-related crimes (committed by bureaucrats), which was further disaggregated into two distinct categories: incidences of sex crime (e.g., prostitution) and incidences of sexual harassment or sexual violence in the workplace (both of which are carried out almost exclusively by males).

Our evidence comes from 16 public agencies in Korea from 2008 to 2014. Korea was chosen as the site of study as it presents a compelling case in which to examine the impact of gender representation on bureaucracy. First, we take advantage of its recent transition from a male-oriented bureaucracy to a more gender-representative organization, as the share of female public officials within its bureaucracy has increased rapidly and sharply over recent decades. Specifically, in 2008, 24.7% of overall bureaucrats were women, but by 2014, this figure had risen to 49.4% (Ministry of the Interior, 2014). This allows us to generate a relatively credible estimate of the impact of gender-based representative bureaucracy. Second, in the Korean case, the wide variation *across departments* also provides a unique opportunity for researchers to examine the impact of gender-based bureaucracy. For instance, in 2014, 65.2% of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family in South Korea consisted of female bureaucrats, whereas only 11.5% of public officials in the National Agency for Administrative City Construction were women (Ministry of the Interior, 2014). This significant difference in the distribution of female administrators over time and across departments makes it more likely for researchers to observe the causal impact of gender representativeness.

Our findings indicate that increased female representation in public organizations is positively associated with an improvement in overall organizational integrity. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that this benefit of representative bureaucracy is greater when the organization leader is female. We then investigate the association between an increase in female representation and gender-related integrity measures, finding that an increased proportion of female bureaucrats leads to a decrease in the number of bureaucrats involved in sex crimes, but an increase, not a decrease, in the incidences of sexual harassment and sexual violence reported in the agencies considered. This apparent contradiction is explained by the fact that greater female representation may empower female officials to report hitherto unreported unfair treatment or injustice. Overall, we conclude that our findings are consistent with the notion that representative bureaucracy with respect to gender improves organizational integrity by empowering the minority group (in this case, female bureaucrats), thereby inspiring them to challenge unfair practices that had been condoned by the majority up to that point.

The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. The next section gives a brief overview of the literature on the impact of representative bureaucracy. This is followed by an explanation of the hypotheses, followed by a discussion of our data, variables, and method. We then explain the results of our analyses, and finally give our conclusion.

## **The Theory of Representative Bureaucracy**

The theory of representative bureaucracy was introduced by Kingsley (1944), who stated that bureaucracies must be representative of the groups they serve. Prior to proposing this theory, Kingsley (1944) leveled the criticism that bureaucracy is essentially a nondemocratic force. According to him, government cannot use authoritarian means for democratic ends, and a bureaucracy is merely one tool that the British (in the context of his study) bourgeoisie used to supplant the landed aristocracy as the chief power in the state. To strengthen this contention, he analyzed the effect of the undemocratic class structure of British education on the civil service.

Kingsley's original concept was extended by Van Riper (1958), who emphasized that a representative bureaucracy must possess a similar demographic composition as the people it represents. Mosher (1968) also developed Kingsley's literature and alleviated the existing confusion by distinguishing between passive and active representation. According to Mosher (1968), a bureaucrat's background affects both his preemployment socialization and his behavior in office, which should be dealt with separately. In this sense, Mosher (1968) proposed measuring, in two different ways, the degree to which the social backgrounds of bureaucrats mirror the community they serve, resulting in the concepts of passive and active representations.

Although normative and legal discourses on representative bureaucracy have advanced (Dowell, 1945; Kingsley, 1944; Long, 1952; Subramaniam, 1967), the theory's validity has also met with skepticism. Some studies have argued that social backgrounds or origins do not determine socialization experiences, and rarely lead to the formation of favorable attitudes toward citizens from identical social groups. That is, opponents of the theory explain that social origins and attitude congruence have a tenuous relationship, and that social origin says little about policy preferences.

To overcome this criticism, numerous empirical studies have endeavored to test the link between passive and active representation (Bradbury & Kellough, 2008; Hindera, 1993; Meier, Stewart, & England, 1991; Rocha & Hawes, 2009; Thielemann & Stewart, 1996). Meier et al. (1991) statistically tested the relationship between the number of Black teachers and Black students with access to equal educational opportunities, and found that electoral, bureaucratic, and social class pressures all had a significant impact on policy implementation. However, Hindera (1993) examined the existing empirical frameworks of attitude congruence, communications, and advocacy. Using data from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission districts, he showed that evidence of the advocacy model related to self-interest is more substantial: Public officials not only advocate for groups to which they belong but also implement policies against groups to which they do not belong.

More recent studies on representative bureaucracy have attempted to specify the theoretical underpinnings of its benefits that have been observed empirically; specifically, they have attempted to answer *why* an improvement in representation creates positive outcomes for public organizations. One proposed explanation by Hong (2016, 2017b), and tested in this study, is that an increase in representation in a public organization allows its members to challenge unfair practices, which may generate intraorganizational tension but ultimately improves organizational integrity and, therefore, overall organizational performance. Empirical tests of this hypothesis have been conducted in relation to ethnicity, but it has yet to be tested in relation to gender representation.

It is surprising that public administration scholarship has focused on ethnicity and paid relatively little attention to the role of gender in this regard. A notable exception is Keiser, Wilkins, Meier, and Holland (2002), who provided empirical evidence of the link between passive and active representation for gender. Imbuing gender with a sociocultural interpretation, Keiser et al. (2002) emphasized the role of institutional characteristics that shape the attitudes and behaviors of individual female bureaucrats. Our study empirically tests whether an increased representation of females in public organizations can have a positive effect on the institutional environment conducive to an improvement in overall bureaucratic performance. Among the many possible measures of performance, we focus on organizational integrity.

We also examine the potential moderating role of female leadership. Public administration scholars have focused on the role of street-level bureaucrats in formulating the theory of representative bureaucracy. For instance, Lipsky (1993) suggested that the level of representation among street-level bureaucrats involves a more direct causal mechanism compared with managers or leaders in higher offices. In this study, however, we acknowledge that the existence of female leaders may potentially have an important effect on the association between representative bureaucracy and organizational integrity. That is, the demographic characteristics of the leadership should also be considered in examining the impacts of representative bureaucracy, because the actions of leaders can significantly affect employees who share common demographic characteristics.

Past research into female leadership has tended to focus on the differences between men and women in terms of leader behavior (Jacobson, Palus, & Bowling, 2009; Stivers, 2002), revealing several distinct characteristics of female leaders. For instance, Fox and Schuhmann (1999) found that female city managers are more likely to incorporate citizen input, facilitate communication, and encourage citizen participation in their decision-making process. Another body of work has shown that the presence of female leaders has positive effects on organizational performance (Brudney, Hebert, & Wright, 2000; Jacobson et al., 2009). Such distinct or positive qualities of female leaders may also work as a factor that magnifies the positive effect of representative bureaucracy in terms of gender.

However, there has also been skepticism over possibly substantial differences between men and women (Dobbins & Platz, 1986; Kanter, 1977; Powell, 1990, 1993). These scholars contend that female leaders share a similar leadership style to male

leaders in that, in reality, they also seek power by reaching a higher position. They also argue that a female leader's unique management style is likely to be restrained by institutional barriers. According to Rehfuss (1986), the possibility of women demonstrating their own leadership may be lower, since primary organizational socialization and later management responsibilities cause them to develop ideologies that work against direct representation of group interest.

Although the evidence of salience for female leadership is mixed, our study maintains its focus on the idea of representative bureaucracy, implying that actors who belong to the same minority group have attitude congruence (Marvel, 2015). Because female leaders and female employees share similar values and experiences, female leaders interact more effectively with female bureaucrats, leading to positive externalities for the organizations.

## Hypotheses

The hypotheses posited in this article are classified into three sections. The first addresses the link between representative bureaucracy and gender-related integrity. The second deals with how representative bureaucracy affects organizational integrity in general. The third assesses the moderating effect of female leadership on the relationship between representative bureaucracy and organizational integrity.

### *Representative Bureaucracy and Gender-Related Integrity Measures*

We examine the influence of an increase in the proportion of female bureaucrats on gender-related integrity. The previous literature on representative bureaucracy has demonstrated that minority public officials represent the interests of the group to which they belong and behave in a more favorable manner toward their group (Bradbury & Kellough, 2008; Hindera, 1993; Meier et al., 1991; Rocha & Hawes, 2009; Thielemann & Stewart, 1996). This indicates that female bureaucrats may be more willing than their male counterparts to fight the injustice of gender inequality and raise a collective voice for women.

In this article, we classify sex crimes into two categories: (a) sex crimes, including prostitution, that are committed outside the organization; and (b) sexual harassment and violence in the workplace. As far as sex crimes are concerned, as the proportion of female bureaucrats increases in public organizations, the male-dominated (and unethical) culture within organizations may be replaced with a more gender-equal culture. This change in ethical culture may force organizations to adopt higher ethical standards for gender-related issues, thus making male public officials more reluctant to engage in sex crimes under strengthened ethical regulations. This is because sex crimes outside the workplace are often reported as occurring during late-night drinking sessions among male workers, and an increase in the number of female colleagues may have an inhibiting effect on such crimes. In other words, in the past, sex crimes outside the organization, including prostitution, were easily condoned in the male-dominated workplace culture, and it may have been difficult for individual members

to decline or resist such practices in homogeneous groups of male workers. As the new ethical regime is established, male bureaucrats will run a greater risk of losing status or dignity within the organization by engaging in such practices.

**Hypothesis 1:** An increase in the proportion of female bureaucrats in government agencies leads to a reduction in external sex crimes.

Next, we posit that an increase in female representation may have different effects on sexual harassment and sexual violence in the workplace than on sex crimes conducted outside the workplace. At first glance, it would seem that an increase in the proportion of female bureaucrats might cause a decrease in the *reported* incidents of sexual harassment and sexual violence in the workplace, because larger numbers of female bureaucrats as a social group would prevent male public officials from engaging in improper behavior toward them. Instead, in this article, we propose the opposite possibility: that *reported* figures of internal sex crimes may, in fact, rise despite this increase.

Internal sex crimes, such as sexual harassment and sexual violence within organizations, may reflect the status of women in an organization. Internal sex crimes are calculated based on reports given by the victims themselves. In this sense, in addition to the occurrence of the crimes themselves, accurate reporting of internal sex crimes requires female bureaucrats to be willing to report incidents. In the context of our study, because sex offenders and victims work together in the same organization, their organizational positions could be another variable that has a significant effect on the number of reported incidents. For instance, this logic is reinforced by past studies on employee silence. Individuals in the organization are likely to suppress genuine expression about their behavioral, cognitive, and affective evaluation of organizational circumstances when they perceive that speaking out could threaten their presence in the organization (Pinder & Harlos, 2001). In other words, female public officials intend to remain *silent* in response to injustices such as sex crimes, based on the fear that expressing their viewpoint would be personally risky.

The main argument of this study is that an increase in female representation will empower women to speak out against unethical organizational cultures condoned by the male majorities. In fact, an increase in the reported incidents of sex crimes as a result of an increased female representation may serve as suggestive but compelling evidence to support the argument of this study. This logic could have been stronger if we could have observed both the reported and actual incidents of sexual crimes. Unfortunately, however, we observe only the former, and will return to this limitation, which stems from data unavailability, in the “Results” section.

Taken together, when the proportion of female bureaucrats was small, women may have been concerned with the aftermath of whistle-blowing. However, as the number of female bureaucrats grows, women may become increasingly willing to report experiences of sex crimes. In other words, women’s tolerance level for unethical behavior may decrease, and they may not be as reluctant as before to identify their male colleagues/superiors as sex offenders. As a result, the *recorded* frequency of internal sex

crimes may actually increase even though the *actual* frequency of the crimes may eventually decrease.

**Hypothesis 2:** An increase in the proportion of female bureaucrats may lead to higher recorded rates of sexual harassment and sexual violence within agencies.

### *Representative Bureaucracy and Overall Integrity Level*

We also examine whether representative bureaucracy has positive impacts not only on gender-related integrity, as formulated by Hypotheses 1 and 2, but also on overall organizational integrity. Studies (e.g., Gino & Galinsky, 2012; Hornstein, Fisch, & Holmes, 1968) in psychology and management have long shown that participants judged others' unethical actions as less morally problematic when they both shared similar characteristics. This finding indicates that if people socially identify with those who engage in unethical behavior, they may also become more likely to engage in such behavior. This evidence suggests that organizations with members who share similar characteristics (such as an organization dominated by males) may have rooted unethical culture or practices that benefit the majorities; such culture or practices can more easily be challenged when the minorities of the organizations are empowered, and making an organization more diverse is one way to empower those minorities. This leads to the hypothesis that an increase in diversity may promote organizational integrity.


Figure 1 presents the potential mechanism by which gender-representative bureaucracy may affect overall bureaucratic integrity. Paradoxically, bureaucratic integrity is improved as inner conflict resulting from diversity increases, because inner conflict strengthens monitoring among organization members. As recent studies have suggested,

Increased representativeness (with resulting increased diversity) may encourage organization members to unite to challenge unjust, corrupt, or unfair practices that were ignored or condoned by the previous majority; such actions may bring a painful but necessary period of self-examination. (Hong, 2017b, p. 197)

This process may in fact push the organizations to adopt higher standards of bureaucratic integrity.

Employing greater numbers of female public officials diminishes male-oriented solidarity within public organizations. An increase in the proportion of female bureaucrats indicates that women form a social group within public organizations, leading to a shift from a male-dominated homogeneous organization to a heterogeneous organization. Greater representation and diversity may thus result in an uprooting of unethical behavior that has been tacitly tolerated to some extent due to homogeneity and solidarity. We thus propose that representative bureaucracy has positive impacts not only on gender-related integrity but also on the level of overall organizational integrity.





**Figure 1.** The impact of representative bureaucracy on organizational integrity.

**Hypothesis 3:** An increase in the proportion of female bureaucrats in government agencies results in improved organizational integrity.

### *The Moderating Role of Female Leadership*

This study also tests the moderating effects of having women as leaders. In studying bureaucratic integrity, examining their role is critical because their actions are vital in fostering an ethical culture, especially in public organizations (Downe, Cowell, & Morgan, 2016). In this study, we focus particularly on the potential role of female leaders in steering the behaviors of female bureaucrats. A growing body of literature on female leadership has found that female leaders can affect the attitudes and behaviors of their gender-congruent employees (Grissom & Keiser, 2011; Hultin & Szulkin, 2003; Marvel, 2015). Thus, an increase in female representation may interact with a leader's gender to influence employees' actions (Wang, Chiang, Tsai, Lin, & Cheng, 2013). Moreover, female leaders may be motivated to interact with their female employees, because female employees often repay the advocacy and positive treatment received from their managers (Hassan, Wright, & Yukl, 2014; Marvel, 2015).

Because female leaders have similar attitudes and values to those of their female subordinates, they may support female employees in trying to promote changes in their organizations. For instance, Tate and Yang (2015) found that women in leadership positions cultivate more female-friendly cultures inside their organizations. Thus, as the organization becomes increasingly gender diverse, the benefits of the increased female representation may become greater in public agencies headed by a female leader. We, therefore, propose the following:

**Hypothesis 4:** Female leadership reinforces the positive association between an increase in the proportion of female bureaucrats and organizational integrity.

### **Data and Method**

Our data were gathered from 16 agencies in the South Korean central government for each year between 2008 and 2014, and the models control for a number of agency characteristics that tend to correspond with integrity in public organizations.

To test the link between representative bureaucracy and organizational integrity, we used two main dependent variables of interest: incidence of gendered crime and an integrity index. As noted above, Keiser et al. (2002) indicated the impact of

representative bureaucracy for female bureaucrats on an organization in relation to gender. In this sense, we used the number of sex crimes as a proxy for the gender-related integrity level. The predicted result was that an increasing percentage of female bureaucrats would correspond to a reduction in sex crimes. The data (from the Ministry of Personnel Management annual reports) were, however, self-reported by the 16 agencies, so their reliability and consistency may have varied.

The integrity index quantifies the extent to which bureaucrats handle their tasks through a transparent and accountable process without engaging in corruption. After adding three scores of integrity measures (i.e., external integrity, internal integrity, and surveyed citizen evaluations), the integrity index was compiled by deducting the value representing corruption cases in administrative agencies and public service-related organizations. The highest score that could be awarded was 10 points, meaning that organizational integrity was higher the closer the score was to 10. According to Hypothesis 3, as the proportion of female employees increases, so will the organizational integrity index score. The integrity index data were collected from the annual reports produced by the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission.


However, the main independent variable of interest in this article was the log proportion of female officials in individual agencies. We followed previous studies in using the proportion of female bureaucrats to all officials (not simply the absolute number of female bureaucrats) as a main variable to accurately measure gender diversity and female representation. The proportion of female officials was log-transformed to enable interpretation of coefficients as percentage impacts. The sources for these data were the governmental White Papers and Statistical Year Books published by the Ministry of the Interior.<sup>1</sup>

We also controlled for agency characteristics that were likely to affect organizational integrity, such as budget size and the number of bureaucrats. Budget size is the log amount of total expenditure. The budget data are accessible electronically from the Annual Budget Report of the Ministry of Planning and Finance; the total number of bureaucrats was drawn from the governmental White Papers and Statistical Year Books provided by the Ministry of the Interior. Sex crimes are closely related to individual behaviors in general; however, it is difficult to define the individual attributes likely to induce a tendency toward sex crimes. The sources for these data were the Annual Audit reports published by the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea. The unit of analysis in this article, therefore, was conducted at government agency level. Instead of controlling for personal characteristics regarding sex crimes, general agency characteristics were added to the models.

Table 1 reports the basic descriptive statistics, and draws attention to the wide variations in sex crimes across government agencies. Although the mean value of sex crimes is relatively small, the standard deviation is quite high. However, the integrity index of public organizations seems to follow a normal distribution. If we look at the proportion of female bureaucrats, the highest is approximately 65% in the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. However, police agencies (the National Police Agency and the Ministry of Public Safety and Security) average a mere 10%. These results seem attributable to the characteristics of the tasks performed

**Table 1.** Descriptive Statistics.

Variable	Observation	M	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Sex crime	112	0.670	1.886	0	14
Sexual violence	112	1.857	5.800	0	42
Sexual harassment	112	0.741	1.795	0	9
Female employee (in log %)	112	0.315	0.150	0.075	0.677
Size of budget (in log)	112	14.37	1.778	10	17.727
Number of bureaucrats (in log)	112	8.153	1.835	5.075	12.807
Organizational integrity index	105	8.028	0.588	6.360	9.040
Female leader	112	0.098	0.299	0	1



**Figure 2.** The proportion of female bureaucrats across agencies.  
 Note. The vertical line represents the average proportion of female bureaucrats in our sample.

by the respective government agencies. Figure 2 provides descriptive information about female bureaucrats in the government. Figure 2 shows the average proportion of female bureaucrats across government agencies during our studied period to be 31.5%.

## Results

### *Gender-Related Crimes*

In Table 2, we estimate the association between the incidence of sex crime and the proportion of female bureaucrats. We present the results of both ordinary least squares (OLS) and Tobit regressions. The Tobit models were employed in addition to the standard OLS to address the issue that our dependent variables are censored with a lower limit of zero incidence of gender-related crimes. We report the results of the two models for each of our three dependent variables (sex crime, sexual violence, and sexual harassment). For example, Model 1 runs the OLS regression with budget and employee-level control variables, whereas Model 2 employs a Tobit regression with the same set of controls. We attempt to show the robustness of the estimated association between the independent variables and the dependent variables by highlighting the similarity between the results of the two models. As reported in Table 2, the coefficients of female officials for each dependent variable are not heavily altered by the type of models (either OLS or Tobit) employed; they are relatively robust.

As can be seen from Table 2, the findings are apparently contradictory in each of the models: As the representation of female bureaucrats increases, the number of bureaucrats involved in sex crimes decreases, but the incidence of sexual harassment and sexual violence in the workplace increases. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 2, the association between female representation and the incidence of sex crime is negative, which suggests that as representation of female public employees increases, the incidence of sex crime decreases. However, the estimated coefficients were not statistically significant. As a result, Hypothesis 1 regarding the association between the proportion of female bureaucrats and sex crime is not supported, although the sign of the coefficients points to the hypothesized direction. However, the findings show a positive association between the proportion of female officials and the incidence of sexual harassment and violence. Columns 3 to 6 in Table 2 indicate that the reported incidence of sexual harassment and violence is correlated strongly and positively with an increased proportion of female officials. Specifically, a 10% increase in the proportion of female officials is associated with an approximately 0.2 standard deviation increase in the reported incidence of either sexual harassment or violence (as reported in the OLS models). In sum, Hypothesis 2, concerning the association between the proportion of female bureaucrats and sexual violence and sexual harassment in the workplace, is supported by the analysis.

We explain the apparent contradiction by following the argument put forward by previous studies (Hong, 2016). As the number of female bureaucrats increases, they become empowered, inspired, and organized to speak up as a group within the organization. That is, women's tolerance levels for gender-related unethical behaviors in the workplace decrease, resulting in increased whistle-blowing by female bureaucrats. This inner conflict between the majority and minority groups ultimately contributes to an improvement in organizational integrity. This argument is supported by the fact that incidents of sexual harassment and violence are reported by the victims working for the public organizations themselves. Along this line of thought, an increase in reported

**Table 2.** Female Representation and Gender-Related Crimes.

	Dependent variable: Incidents of gender-related crimes					
	Sex crime		Sexual violence		Sexual harassment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	Tobit	OLS	Tobit	OLS	Tobit
Female employee (in log %)	-0.867 (1.406)	2.102 (4.925)	12.07** (3.863)	12.27** (3.801)	3.366** (0.968)	4.773** (1.354)
Size of budget (in log)	-0.009 (0.034)	0.692** (0.230)	0.253 (0.165)	0.166 (0.441)	0.089 (0.048)	0.263 (0.228)
Number of employees (in log)	0.575** (0.204)	1.586** (0.438)	1.923** (0.218)	4.691** (0.831)	0.619** (0.132)	1.383** (0.289)
Constant	-3.610** (0.858)	-25.81** (5.635)	-21.27** (3.838)	-49.59** (11.95)	-6.640** (1.007)	-18.45** (3.005)
/sigma		3.254** (0.538)		5.457** (1.345)		2.234** (0.335)
N	112	112	112	112	112	112
R <sup>2</sup>	.311	.244	.535	.278	.557	.291

Note. Standard errors in parentheses. OLS = ordinary least squares.

\* $p < .10$ . \*\* $p < .05$ .

incidents can also be considered a proxy for the inner conflicts prompted by an increase in representation, ultimately resulting in an improvement of bureaucratic integrity.

It is important to note, however, that the presented evidence may be interpreted in a directly opposite way: that, an increase in female representation leads to an increase in *actual* incidents of sex crimes in the workplace. In fact, it would be necessary to observe both the reported and actual incidents to test these two competing interpretations; however, we were only able to observe the former. Nevertheless, we believe that our result provides suggestive but compelling evidence in support of Hypothesis 2, indicating that an increase in female representation leads to a decrease in sex crimes outside the workplace (columns 1 and 2 of Table 2) and an increase in overall organizational integrity (Table 3). Given such findings, as well as the fact that sex crimes in the workplace were reported by the female workers themselves, we believe it is not unreasonable to conclude from our results that the number of reported incidents increased while the actual number of incidents may have not changed significantly.

### Overall Organizational Integrity

We then examined the impacts of increased female representation on overall organizational integrity. The results are reported in Table 3. In column 1 of Table 3, the estimated coefficient is positive but not statistically significant without any control

**Table 3.** Female Representation and Organizational Integrity.

	Dependent variable: Organizational integrity index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female employee (in log %)	0.421 (0.294)	0.508* (0.249)	0.593** (0.223)
Female employee × Female leader			2.923* (1.209)
Female leader			-0.373** (0.125)
Size of budget (in log)		-0.036 (0.026)	-0.036 (0.028)
Number of employees (in log)		-0.099** (0.023)	-0.095** (0.026)
Constant	7.894** (0.264)	9.198** (0.338)	9.155** (0.361)
N	105	105	105
R <sup>2</sup>	.012	.147	.194


Note. Standard errors in parentheses.

\* $p < .10$ . \*\* $p < .05$ .

variables. Once the number of public employees and budget size are controlled, the estimated association becomes significant. The results in column 2 indicate that a 10% increase in the proportion of female officials is associated with a 0.05-point increase in the organizational integrity index, which is an approximately 0.1 standard deviation increase. This estimate is modest but still significant given that the evaluated level of overall organizational integrity does not generally change in a short period. Overall, Hypothesis 3, which posits a positive relationship between female representation and organizational integrity, is supported by the analysis.

### *Female Leadership*

Finally, column 3 of Table 3 shows the estimated effect of female leadership. We propose that the positive influence of increased female representation on bureaucratic integrity can be magnified if the organization has a female leader. That is, the existence of female leadership may further inspire employees to challenge prejudices, and corrupt or unfair practices, that may have been condoned or ignored by the majority group. This can occur as the minority group becomes empowered, and the existence of a leader from the minority group can be more conducive to such organizational transformations. As column 3 of Table 3 shows, we found that the existence of a female leader has a positive influence on the association between the proportion of female officials and bureaucratic integrity.



**Figure 3.** Female representation, organizational integrity, and female leadership.

Note. “Low female representation” corresponds to the value of female representation that is one standard deviation below the mean, whereas “high female representation” corresponds to the value that is one standard deviation above the mean.

The positive influence that female leaders have on organizational integrity is evident in Figure 3. In Figure 3, we plot the average organizational index scores for different configurations of the combinations of our key variables (i.e., female leadership and female representation). These numbers come directly from the estimated coefficients in column 3 of Table 3. We set control variables at their mean values, took the product of the coefficients and values and then totaled these quantities (7.943). We then added this number to the values we obtained for different configurations of the key variables. In Figure 3, we show how the organizational integrity index may change as the proportion of female officials changes in an organization. As can be seen, this increase has a positive effect on the organizational index, regardless of the organization leader’s gender. However, the association between female representation and the organizational index becomes clearly stronger when the organization has a female, rather than a male, leader. All in all, we conclude that our estimates generally support Hypothesis 4.

## Conclusion and Limitations

Our findings indicate that an increase in the proportion of female employees in a given public agency is associated with an improvement in the organizational integrity index. Specifically, a 100% increase in the proportion of female officials is associated with a

0.5-point increase in the organizational integrity index, which is an approximately one standard deviation increase. This finding supports the argument that gender-representative bureaucracy also contributes to an improvement in bureaucratic integrity.

We also tested whether an increase in female representation affects gender-related integrity, as measured by the incidence of gender-related crime. The evidence suggests that as the proportion of female employees increases, the number of reported incidents of sexual harassment and violence in the workplace also increases, rather than decreases. We argue that this apparent paradox indeed supports, rather than undermines, the main thesis of this article. That is, as the number of incidents of sexual harassment and violence in the workplace is collected via female employees' self-reports, a reported increase in gendered crimes may be interpreted as a sign that women have become more empowered and willing to report unfair practices against them that had hitherto been tolerated. That is, the increased reported incidence of sex crimes in the workplace is likely to indicate the potential inner conflicts between the majority and minority groups that eventually have a positive influence on organizational integrity.

This article also aimed to uncover the potential role of the leader's gender in generating the benefits of representative bureaucracy. Overall, our findings suggest that the benefits of representative bureaucracy may be substantially magnified when increases in female representation occur in organizations with female leadership. Past research in public administration has focused on the role of street-level bureaucrats in explaining the theory of representative bureaucracy (Andrews et al., 2014; Hong, 2017a). The evidence presented in this article, however, shows that the existence of a female leader may create a positive institutional environment in which the behaviors and actions of street-level bureaucrats may change in a positive way.

From a practitioner's perspective, our findings suggest that efforts to elevate the level of gender representation within a bureaucracy are of great importance for a variety of reasons. Beyond the basic issue of promoting women's right in hiring and promotion, diversifying the workforce may also ensure a higher degree of organizational integrity through conflicts and monitoring among members of the organization. In addition, our research provides a solid empirical foundation that female leaders play a positive role in a more gender-representative bureaucracy.

Despite its contributions, this study has several limitations. First, we admit that we were unable to control for all factors that may potentially affect individual officers' behaviors and actions. If there are unobservable factors that differ across public agencies but affect the dependent variable, our estimated coefficients may be biased. In Korea, however, most public employees are recruited through a centralized admission system and then distributed to individual public agencies. This centralized system may indicate that public agencies are likely to share at least some characteristics in common.

Second, although this study highlights the benefits of representative bureaucracy, the conflicts among employees created by an increased level of representation in an organization may also have some negative side effects unobserved in this study. That is, there might be some trade-offs involved in an increased level of representation and diversity. For instance, a recent article by *The Economist* pointed out the possibility of "diversity fatigue," which suggests that diversity may in fact damage trust among



employees (“Diversity Fatigue,” 2016). Establishing trust is a more onerous task in diverse teams compared with in those with less diversity, because team members do not share much in common. This negative side of greater representation and diversity may result in a higher level of variance in an organization’s performance, as reported by some prior research (for instance, Livermore, 2016). Taken together, the evidence may imply that managers of representative organizations need to devote greater attention to building mutual trust among employees in the organization, so that the conflicts created by representation that is more equitable can have a positive influence on organizational integrity and performance.

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### Note

1. In South Korea, the number of women filling government posts has increased. During the period studied (2008-2014), the proportion of female bureaucrats increased from 48% to 49.5%. There was also a steady increase in the absolute number of female officials. Although 263,316 female officials worked for the government in 2008, 43,436 more were employed in the administrative agencies in 2014. As a result, the number of female officials who have become higher level bureaucrats has increased. According to government press releases, although the proportion of female officials at Level 3 or higher was 0.1% (17 officials) in 2000, this increased to 0.2% (51 officials) in 2010. In terms of lower positions, such as Level 4 or 5, women’s expanded participation in the public service is more noticeable.

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